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Wintersemester 2022/23Wintersemester 2022/23
7.2.2023 : 19:14 : +0100

Seminar in International Economics im Wintersemester 2022/23


Das FIW bietet gemeinsam mit dem Wiener Institut für Internationale Wirtschaftsvergleiche (wiiw) regelmäßig Vorlesungen in Form eines Seminars in "International Economics" an.

Heterogeneous Trade Elasticity and Managerial Skills


Thursday, 22nd of September 2022, 3:00 p.m. (CET)

Online Event

Gianluca Orefice, University of Paris-Dauphine


Registration link:


This presentation is based on a paper co-authored with Maria Bas, Lionel Fontagné and Irene Iodice.


This paper investigates the role played by firms’ managerial skills on the heterogeneous reaction of exporters to real exchange rate changes. Our empirical analysis relies on detailed firm-product-destination level export data from France for the period 1995-2008 matched with specific information on firms’ skill composition by occupation (managers, R&D workers, professionals and technicians). Our findings show that high-skill intensive firms have larger exporter price elasticity to real exchange rate variations and a lower elasticity of export quantities. While a 10% depreciation of the real exchange rate makes firms with sample-average skill intensity charging 0.5% higher export price, we show that this effect is 40% higher for exporters with one standard deviation larger skill intensity. Managers and R&D workers contribute the most to this heterogeneous pricing-to-market behavior offirms. These findings are robust to controlling for the competing explanations of firm productivity and quality.


The Political Consequences of Green Policies: Evidence from Italy (Hybrid event)


Wednesday, 05th of October 2022, 3:30 p.m. (CET)
Attention: the date has been changed (formerly 6th of October at 2:30 p.m.)
Hybrid Event

Italo Colantone, Bocconi University


On-site: wiiw, Rahlgasse 3, 1060 Vienna or
Online: via Zoom
For participating in discussion at the Q&A session better, we highly recommend on-site particiaption.


Registration link for on-site participation:


Registration link for online participation:


The presentation is based on a paper co-authored with Livio Di Lonardo, Yotam Margalit and Marco Percoco.


For many governments enacting green policies is a priority, but these often entail substantial and uneven costs on citizens. How does the introduction of green policies affect voting? We study this question in the context of a major ban on polluting cars introduced in Milan. The policy was strongly opposed by the right-wing populist party Lega, portraying it as a “radical-chic-leftist” initiative penalizing common people. We show that owners of banned vehicles—who incurred a median loss of €3,750—were significantly more likely to vote for Lega in the subsequent elections. This electoral shift does not stem from increased environmental skepticism, but rather from the perceived unfairness of the policy and its pocketbook implications. In fact, recipients of compensation from the local government were not more likely to switch to Lega. The findings underscore that addressing the distributive consequences is key for advancing green policies that are politically sustainable.


O-Ring Production Networks

Thursday, 10th of November 2022, 3:30 p.m. (CET)


Banu Demir Pakel, University of Oxford


Registration link:
The dial-in link will be sent immediately after registration.


This presentation is based on a paper co-authored with Cecilia Fieler, Daniel Xu, and Kelly Yang.


We study a production network where quality choices are interconnected across firms. High-quality firms are skill intensive and trade more with other high-quality firms. Using data from Turkish firms, we document strong assortative matching of skills in the production network. A firm-specific export demand shock from a rich country increases the firm’s skill intensity and shifts the firm toward skill- intensive domestic partners. We develop a quantitative model with heterogeneous firms, endogenous quality choices, and network formation. An economy-wide export demand shock of 5 percent induces exporters and non-exporters to upgrade quality, raising the average wage by 1.2 percent. This effect is about nine times the effect in a special case of the model with no interconnection of quality choices.


Evaluating the implementation of the DCFTAs between the EU, Georgia and Moldova


Thursday, 24th of November 2022, 3:00 p.m. (CET)


Tinatin Akhvlediani, Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)


Registration link:
The dial-in link will be sent immediately after registration.


This presentation is based on a paper co-authored with Steven Blockmans, Julie Bryhn, Stanislav Ghiletchi, Lali Gogoberidze, Daniel Gros, Weinian Hu, Diego Iribarren, Tamara Kovziridze, Irina Kustova, Mihai Mogildea, Liliana Palihovici, Iulian Rusu and Farzaneh Shamsfakhr.


Since 2014, the European Union (EU) has in place a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTAs) with Georgia and Moldova as part of the Association Agreement. The European Commission has commissioned a consortium led by the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) to undertake an evaluation of the implementation and impact of the DCFTAs. The evaluation will be carried out between February 2021 and April 2022 and will analyse the economic, social and environmental, and human rights (including labour rights) effects which the DCFTAs have had since their application. In terms of the evaluation criteria, as requested by the Terms of Reference (ToR), the study will assess the effectiveness, impact, efficiency, coherence and relevance of the DCFTAs.


The Balance of Concessions in the Trade Agreements


Thursday, 1st of December 2022, 3:30 p.m. (CET)
Online Event

Mostafa Beshkar, Indiana University


Registration link:
The dial-in link will be sent immediately after registration.


This presentation is based on a paper co-authored with Pao-Li Chang and Shenxi Song.


Reciprocity is a key principle governing the negotiations under the GATT/WTO agreement, which calls for a balance of concessions among the WTO members. In recent years, however, various politicians across the world have voiced concerns about their country's excessive obligations under the WTO and a lack of reciprocation by their trading partners. Our objective in this paper is to evaluate the degree to which the pattern of applied tariffs across WTO members deviates from a balanced-concession condition. To this end, we employ a quantitative trade model and use alternative definitions of reciprocity to measure the concessions received and given by each country from 1995 to 2011. We find that over time, concessions have become more unbalanced mostly due to an increase in trade imbalances.


Brothers in Arms: The Value of Coalitions in Sanctions Regimes


Tuesday, 31st January 2023, 3:00 pm (CET)
Online Event

Joschka Wanner, University of Potsdam


Registration link:
This is an online event via Zoom. Please register for the dial-in link. The link will be sent immediately after registration.


This presentation is based on a paper co-authored with Sonali Chowdhry, Julian Hinz, Katrin Kamin.


This paper examines the impact of coalitions on the economic costs of the 2012 Iran and 2014 Russia sanctions. By estimating and simulating a quantitative general equilibrium trade model under different coalition set-ups, we (i) dissect welfare losses for sanction-senders and target; (ii) compare prospective coalition partners and; (iii) provide bounds for the sanctions potential — the maximum welfare change attainable — when sanctions are scaled vertically, i.e. across sectors up to an embargo, or horizontally, i.e. across countries up to a global regime. To gauge the significance of simulation outcomes, we implement a Bayesian bootstrap procedure that generates confidence bands. We find that the implemented measures against Iran and Russia inflicted considerable economic harm, yielding 32 – 37% of the vertical sanctions' potential. Our key finding is that coalitions lower the average welfare loss incurred from sanctions relative to unilateral implementation. They also increase the welfare loss imposed on Iran and Russia. Adding China to the coalition further amplifies the welfare loss by 79% for Iran and 22% for Russia. Finally, we quantify transfers that would equalize losses across coalition members. These hypothetical transfers can be seen as a sanctions-equivalent of NATO spending goals and provide a measure of the relative burden borne by coalition countries.